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NOTES AND COMMENTS
by reason of failure to state an essential element of the crime charged in
the count.' It appears that the court is no longer willing to sustain a
general verdict of guilty to an indictment containing mutually exclusive
counts when one of the counts is defective.17
EMMANUEL M. PATURIS
Eminent Domain-Limited Access Highways
In a recent note in this Law Review,' a question was raised as to
what authority the State Highway and Public Works Commission has to
create limited-access highways in this state. This question was before
the North Carolina Supreme Court for the first time in Hedrick v.
Graham.2  In this case, an owner of land which abutted on a public
highway requested an injunction to prohibit the Commission from re-
stricting access to that highway except at certain designated points.
The lower court sustained the Commission's demurrer and the supreme
court affirmed. In so ruling, the court veered from its policy of strictly
construing eminent domain statutes against the state.3 Instead, the court
emphasized the benefits to the public that emanate from a limited-access
highway, liberally construed statutes then in effect, and found that the
Commission had the power to condemn land for limited-access highways.
Three factors in particular were pointed out by the court in reaching
16 Although State v. Toole, 106 N. C. 736, 11 S. E. 168 (1890), did not involve
counts charging mutually exclusive crimes, the case clearly stated a rule of law
which became the basis of later decisions. In that case the court stated that where
a general verdict of guilty is rendered against an indictment charging offenses of the
same grade and subject to the same or similar punishment, the verdict upon either
count, if valid, supports the judgment, ".... and it is immaterial that the verdict as
to the other counts is not good, either by reason of defective counts, or by the ad-
mission of incompetent evidence, or giving objectionable instructions as to such
other counts, provided the errors complained of do not affect the valid verdict
rendered on this count." Id. at 739, 11 S. E. at 169. State v. Carter, 113 N. C.
639, 18 S. E. 517 (1893), also involved larceny and receiving stolen goods; and
although both counts were declared to be valid, the court said that if only one of
the counts was valid the general verdict of guilty would be placed on the good
count.
17 It is conceivable that this stand may lead the court to eventually overrule the
case of State v. Baker, 63 N. C. 276 (1869). In the Baker case the defendant
was charged in four separate counts for homicide. Evidence was given as to the
first count only. The general verdict of guilty was sustained on the basis that the
conviction was presumed to have been upon the valid count. If the same situation
would appear in the future, the same reasoning could be applied as was used in the
Meslzaw case. Are not counts which state the same offense in different manners
as mutually exclusive as the counts of larceny and receiving? Would not all
defective counts, regardless of the reason, be equally unable to sustain a conviction?
A general verdict of guilty is a verdict of guilty as to each count, but the defendant
can be guilty of only one of the counts. If the court is unwilling to presume
the conviction rested upon the valid count, there would be a new trial.
134 N. C. L. REv. 130 (1955).
*245 N. C. 249, 96 S. E. 2d 129 (1957).
* Sechriest v. Thomasville, 202 N. C. 108, 162 S. E. 212 (1932).
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its decision. First, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 19564 encourages
the creation of a national highway system and offers federal funds to
those states agreeing to comply with standards prescribed in the act and
to be prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce. One criterion contained
in this act is that states will not add points of access to roads in this
system without approval of the Secretary of Commerce.r Our General
Assembly has provided that the Commission "... . shall have such powers
as are necessary to comply fully with the provisions of the present or
future federal aid acts."
Second, the court emphasized the importance of the safety aspect in
highway planning and construction. There is no doubt that highways
are safer where access is limited. But this is commonly considered an
argument more appropriately made to the General Assembly than to the
court.7 It is not usually felt to be sufficient grounds for the court to dis-
regard obvious legislative intent.
Third, the broad language of chapter 136 of the General Statutes on
Roads and Highways was found to confer the power in question on the
Commission. Concerning the statutes, excerpts from sections 1,8 18(b), 9
18(e), 10 and 1911 of chapter 136 are referred to by the court as "not
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, but are so clear and plain .. .that
there can be no reasonable doubt as to their meaning .... -12 This
interpretation is contrary to the rule of long standing in most juris-
dictions, including North Carolina, that eminent domain statutes are
'70 STAT. 374 (1956), 23 U. S. C. §§ 151-75 (Supp. IV, 1957).
170 STAT. 383 (1956), 23 U. S. C. § 163 (Supp. IV, 1957).I N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-18(1) (1952). This statute raises a question beyond
the scope'of this Note, viz., whether or not a grant of legislative power to an ad-
ministrative agency, allowing it to comply with provisions of federal statutes that
may be passed in the future, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power.
The legislature has the law making function and the courts will not usurp it.
Elliott v. Elliott, 235 N. C. 153, 69 S. E. 2d 224 (1952) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 185
N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923) ; State v. Barksdale, 181 N. C. 621, 107 S. E. 505
(1921) ; Hightower v. Raleigh, 150 N. C. 569, 65 S. E. 279 (1909).
I "The intent and purpose of this section is that there shall be maintained and
developed a State-wide highway system commensurate with needs of the State as
a whole and not to sacrifice the general state-wide interest to the purely local desires
of any division." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-1 (1952).
' The Commission has power "to acquire by gift, purchase, or otherwise, any
road or highway, or tract of land or other property whatsover that may be neces-
sary for a State highway system." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-18(b) (1952).
'0 The Commission has power "to make rules, regulations and ordinances for
the use of, and to police traffic on, the State highways ... N." . C. GEN. STAT.
§ 136-18(e) (1952).
"The Commission may condemn private property "as it may deem necessary
and suitable for road construction, maintenance, and repair, and the necessary ap-
proaches and ways through, and a sufficient amount of land surrounding and
adjacent thereto, as it may determine to enable it to properly prosecute the work."
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1952).
1 245 N. C. at 260, 96 S. E. 2d at 137.
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to be strictly construed.' 3 These statutes do not even mention limited-
access; in fact, according to a source' 4 cited by the court in the prin-
cipal case, a system of limited-access highways was not provided for
by statute in any state until 1938.15
Reading the sections as a whole, it appears that the General Assembly
was concerned with condemnation of land, not rights16 of owners of
property adjacent to that condemned land. The reasons for allowing
the Commission to condemn any more land than necessary for the road
itself were for the purpose of drainage, elimination of overhanging trees,
etc.
In 1951, the question raised by the Hedrick case was acted on by the
General Assembly when a highway bill' 7 providing for restriction of
highway access by the Commission died in committee. The court con-
sidered this in the principal case, but stated that 170 miles of limited-
access roads were in use in the state by 1955 and that the General As-
sembly did nothing to curtail them. It also states as a rule that courts
are controlled by the language of the statute, the subject matter, and
purpose, rather than what the General Assembly thought the interpreta-
tion should be, and that the language of these statutes is so clear as to
suggest only one meaning.' s This bill authorized the acquisition of an
entire lot, if advantageous to the public, although not needed for the
right of way. The court points out that this may have been the reason
the bill was not passed. Finally, the court states that, "Perhaps, the
Senate thought that the Commission had the power under existing
statutes to construct limited-access roads, and that was the reason it
declined to pass the House Bill."'"
This writer has been able to find only one jurisdiction in the country
with a holding similar to the Hedrick case, based on similar fact and
statutory situations.20  In that case, the statute offers stronger support
" Blanton v. Fagerstrom, 249 Ala. 485, 31 So. 2d 330 (1947); Hampton v.
Arkansas State Game & Fish Commission, 218 Ark. 757, 238 S. W. 2d 950 (1951) ;
Johnson City Southern Ry. v. South and Western Ry., 148 N. C. 59, 61 S. E. 683(1908). But see, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., 141 F. Supp.
300 (D. Wyo. 1956).
" LEv N, PuBac CONTROL OF HIGHWAY AccEss & ROADSIDE DEVEOPMENT 19
(1947).
" The sections referred to above, supra notes 8-11, were enacted originally
between 1921-33.
" At common law, condemnation of land for a public road had no effect on the
right of access invested in abutting property owners. McCandless v. City of Los
Angeles, 10 Cal. App. 2d 407, 4 P. 2d 139 (1931); Minnequa Lumber Co. v. City
and County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1920) ; City of Atlanta v. Gore,
40 Ga. App. 70, 169 S. E. 776 (1933).17 House Bill No. 569, Session 1951, N. C. General Assembly.
118 245 N. C. at 260, 96 S. E. 2d at 137.
10 Ibid.
-o Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d 394 (1945).
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for the court's decision.21 In another case,22 embodying the same issues
and similar facts, the court held against the state, saying that: "... in the
enactment of this statute the legislature did not have in mind the acquire-
ment of access rights . . . ." Legislative intent was recognized and ac-
knowledged by this court in that their legislature had previously failed
to pass a proposed bill 23 similar to our 1951 highway bill.
With regard to the issue in the Hedrick case, the 1957 General
Assembly has eliminated the problem of statutory construction by pass-
age of a new highway bill 24 authorizing the Commission to restrict
access. Yet the broader and more important problem still remains: has
the court changed its rule of long standing that eminent domain statutes
will be strictly construed?
BoYD B. MASSAGEE
Fair Labor Standards Act-Wage and Hour-Coverage of New
Construction
Plaintiff-workers were engaged in building a $37,000,000 causeway,
twenty-five miles long, across Lake Pontchartrain immediately north of
New Orleans. This was a new project designed to relieve traffic con-
gestion on old highways around the east and west shores of the lake.
It was physically separated from existing highways, but when completed,
it would be an integral part of the state and federal highway systems,
with four-lane approach roads connecting with east-west and north-
south U. S. highways. Plaintiffs were also engaged in building a field
plant at the job site, which, when completed, would house the casting
of huge concrete pillars and deck slabs which were to serve as the
base of the causeway. Plaintiffs brought an action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act' for penalties and overtime compensation. The
construction company defended on the ground that this was new con-
struction and that therefore the act was inapplicable to these operations.
21 MINN. STAT. ANx. § 161.03 Subd. 1 (West 1945). The Commissioner is
authorized "to acquire by purchase, gift or condemnation . . . all necessary right
of way needed in laying out and constructing the trunk highway system . . ..
" State v. Superior Court for Cowlitz County, 33 Wash. 2d 638, 206 P. 2d 1028
(1949).
2 Id. at 645, 206 P. 2d at 1032.
24 N. C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 993. Section 5 of this law is as follows: "Acquisi-
tion of property and property rights. For the purposes of this Act, the Commission
may acquire private or public property and property rights for contolled-access
facilities and service or frontage roads, including rights of access, air, view and
light, by gift, devise, purchase, or condemnation in the same manner as now or
hereafter authorized by law to acquire such property or property rights in con-
nection with highways ....
IFair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 201-211 (1956).
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